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The Trans-Pacific Partnership: 
The Economic Implications for Maine
by Catherine Reilly deLutio and Philip A. Trostel
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a free-trade agreement (FTA) between 12 Pacific-Rim countries. If passed, it 
would be the largest FTA in which the United States participates. Catherine Reilly deLutio and Philip Trostel assess 
the potential impact of the TPP’s tariff reductions and quota increases on Maine’s economy. The results suggest that 
the TPP would likely generate slight increases in overall measures of Maine’s economy. The benefits would be rela-
tively small and spread across the population.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed free-trade agreement (FTA) between 12 Pacific-Rim 
countries (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the 
United States, and Vietnam). If passed, it would be 
one of the world’s largest FTAs. Debate on the TPP 
has exposed starkly different views of how to secure 
the position of the United States in the world economy. 
This article contextualizes the debate and brings it to the 
state level by illuminating the TPP’s potential economic 
impact on Maine.  
The TPP covers numerous complex topics ranging 
from typical trade issues such as import duties and 
customs regulations to less obvious issues such as 
government procurement, patent laws, and labor and 
environmental standards. Moreover, the TPP’s unwritten 
geopolitical implications may be as 
complex and important as the agree-
ments codified in its text.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
US TRADE POLICY
Trade has been a central economic and political issue in the United 
States since the country’s founding. 
Before 1789, each state had its own 
tariffs that protected its favored 
industries and often restricted 
imports from neighboring states, an 
unwieldly protectionist system that 
hindered commerce. In 1789, the 
states gave Congress the power to 
remove barriers to interstate trade 
and regulate international trade.
Like many governments of its 
time, the early US government 
imposed tariffs on select imports to 
aid domestic producers and generate 
Figure 1: Historical US Tariffs
Source: USITC 2011.
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revenue. Over time, those tariffs fell as the country 
embraced trade and entered into reciprocal trade agree-
ments with other countries. As Figure 1 shows, the 
average US tariff fell from 52 percent in 1899 to 16 
percent in 1920 (USITC 2011). The Great Depression 
disrupted that decline as Congress passed high tariffs to 
protect struggling domestic producers. The average tariff 
peaked at 59 percent in 1932. That strategy backfired 
when other countries imposed retaliatory tariffs. World 
trade declined sharply and deepened the Great 
Depression (Madsen 2001).  
In 1934, believing that economic recovery relied in 
part on reviving international trade, Congress passed the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), which gave 
the president the authority to negotiate reciprocal tariff 
agreements with other countries. World War II gave 
added urgency to the call for trade liberalization, as 
many people believed the collapse of world trade had 
contributed to global unrest. Countries sought to repair 
their damaged economies and solidify peace through 
multilateral cooperation. 
In 1947, the United States, Canada, India, Australia, 
and 19 other European, African, Middle Eastern, and 
South American countries began a new era of interna-
tional trade by signing the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), which created the framework of the 
multilateral trading system that exists today. Over the 
next few decades, the GATT’s membership grew and 
trade barriers between GATT countries fell. 
The GATT eventually led to formation of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, which now 
has 162 members representing 90 percent of the world’s 
population. WTO members agree to treat products 
imported from all other members equally. In other 
words, a country cannot lower tariffs for one WTO 
member without lowering them for all members. The 
exception is when two members enter into a separately 
negotiated reciprocal FTA. The WTO’s broad member-
ship makes it challenging to reach consensus on some 
topics. Many countries have turned to regional agree-
ments such as the TPP to negotiate complex issues such 
as intellectual property rights, copyright laws, interna-
tional data flows, debit and credit cards, customs regula-
tions, and environmental and labor practices.
Today, the United States has a relatively liberal trade 
policy compared to earlier periods. About two-thirds of 
US imports are duty free, and the average tariff on the 
remaining one-third is just 4.4 percent. At that level, 
exchange rates can have a stronger impact on import 
prices than tariffs. However, select agricultural and manu-
factured goods such as sugar, dairy products, cotton, 
sneakers, and automobile parts still have high tariffs. 
TODAY’S GLOBAL ECONOMY
Globalization refers to the growing integration of economic activities across international borders. 
Three components of globalization are particularly 
relevant to trade: falling transportation costs, advances 
in telecommunication, and growth in low-income 
countries. 
Transportation
Products now traverse the globe faster and more 
reliably than before. The development of containers in 
the 1970s revolutionized the shipping industry, greatly 
reducing the time needed to load, unload, and transfer 
goods between ships, trucks, and rail cars. The cost of air 
transport has plummeted and opened entirely new 
markets for fresh goods that would spoil on long sea 
voyages. Air transport now accounts for roughly 
one-quarter of US imports and exports by value.1
Telecommunication
Worldwide, over 3 billion people used the internet 
in 2015, up from 400 million in 2000 (ITU 2015). 
Internet access increases productivity by helping busi-
nesses communicate better with suppliers, find qualified 
employees, learn about market developments, and use a 
greater variety of cost-saving technologies and services. 
CONSUMER BENEFITS OF TRADE
Today’s average US home is a showcase of foods, 
clothes, electronics, and household items made 
in other countries. Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal 
(2016) estimate that low-priced imports increase US 
consumers’ purchasing power by 8 percent in aggre-
gate. The savings are even greater (up to 69 percent) 
for low-income consumers, who spend a higher 
portion of their income on traded goods. 
Aggregated across the entire economy, these gains 
are dramatic. US consumers spent $6.8 trillion in 
2014 (USBLS 2015). An 8 percent savings on that 
sum is over $543 billion, nearly equivalent to the 
entire economic output of Maine, Massachusetts, 
and New Hampshire that year. 
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Furthermore, the internet creates an unprecedented 
opportunity to connect with new customers both 
domestically and around the globe. 
Advances in telecommunication, coupled with 
advances in transportation, allow companies to segment 
their operations and locate each business activity in the 
most advantageous location. People, designs, and proto-
types can move quickly from one location to another 
without delaying the flow of business. Companies can 
now lower their costs by locating low-skilled assembly 
operations in low-wage countries. 
Global Development
As low-income countries around the world grow 
and industrialize, they become larger players in the 
global economy. Asia’s share of global economic activity 
doubled from 19 percent in 1980 to 38 percent in 2015. 
Goods from China alone have increased from 3.1 
percent of US imports in 1990 to 21.5 percent in 2015. 
This growth has helped lift hundreds of millions of 
people out of extreme poverty (Olinto et al. 2013). 
However, trade theory predicts that increased imports 
from low-wage countries will put downward pressure on 
the value of low-skilled labor in the United States, which 
has indeed happened. 
Globalization is a powerful force that has perma-
nently altered the scale on which people do business. 
The economies of hundreds of countries are now 
complexly intertwined; the consequences of events and 
developments in each country now ripple farther and 
faster than ever before.
THE IMPACT OF TRADE ON US WORKERS
During the mid-twentieth century, US trade liberal-ization coincided with steadily rising employment. 
Employment grew even as the share of US workers in 
manufacturing declined from its peak of 37.9 percent 
in 1943 to 8.7 percent in 2015 (US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics). Average hourly earnings increased signifi-
cantly from 1950 to the late 1970s, peaking at $23.56 in 
1978 (measured in 2015 dollars). Since then, real wages 
have stagnated. There is an active debate about the 
source of wage stagnation. It appears to be the result of 
several factors including trade, technological advances, 
and the distribution of corporate profits. The degree 
to which trade affects individual workers depends on 
several variables.
Import-Competing Versus Nonimport-Competing
Perhaps the simplest factor determining whether 
trade affects workers is the degree to which their 
industry competes with foreign imports. Foreign compe-
tition has hit US manufacturers particularly hard. US 
service providers, in contrast, have been somewhat shel-
tered; a haircut, a hotel room, or an electrical repair 
cannot be made in one country and used in another. 
Trade has helped some service industries by reducing the 
cost of inputs and increasing consumers’ purchasing 
power. Technology is beginning to expand trade into 
formerly nontraded services, for instance accounting, 
graphic design, and medical transcription, and that 
trend is likely to continue (Pisani and Ricart 2016).
Exporting Versus Nonexporting
Businesses that successfully tap into export markets 
can hire more workers and often pay better wages. One 
study of US workers found that a 1 percent increase in 
exports by their industry led to a 1 percent increase in 
wages even for individuals in low-skilled occupations 
(Ebenstein et al. 2014). Export opportunities are not 
reserved for large-scale operations. The Maine elver 
fishery is a good example of an economic opportunity 
that would not exist without international trade. 
High-Skilled Versus Low-Skilled
In some cases, the skills and occupation of indi-
vidual US workers can be a stronger determinant of how 
trade affects their earnings than their industry (Ebenstein 
et al. 2014). According to Ebenstein et al. (2014), 
during the 1980s and 1990s, there was a decline of 6 
million routine (low-skill) positions in manufacturing, 
but an increase of 1 million nonroutine (high-skill) 
positions. Increased trade with low-income countries 
has put downward pressure on the value of low-skilled 
labor in the United States while putting upward pres-
sure on the value of high-skilled labor. 
Regional Variations
Classical economic theory maintained that workers 
adversely affected by trade would eventually transition 
to other industries or relocate to areas with stronger 
economies. Recent research has challenged this thinking. 
Empirical evidence shows that areas with concentrations 
of labor-intense manufacturing industries (which have 
generally suffered the most from import competition) 
have persistently higher unemployment, lower wages, 
and lower labor market participation (Autor et al. 2013). 
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Part of that may be lower relocation rates among 
workers without a college degree; they are less likely to 
move in search of new job opportunities (Taylor et al. 
2008). Falling home prices in depressed areas also raise 
the cost of moving. In these areas, growth in less affected 
parts of the economy has not been able to absorb the 
high number of displaced workers.
MAINE’S ECONOMY POST-NAFTA
Assessing the TPP’s potential impact on Maine requires an understanding of how the state’s economy 
has responded to the global forces described earlier, and 
where it now stands. This article uses implementation of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 
1994 as a benchmark to examine these changes. 
Measures of Overall Growth
By several key measures, Maine’s overall economy 
has grown since 1994. On average, median household 
income rose 0.86 percent per year adjusting for inflation, 
surpassing the national rate of 0.31 percent. In all, 
Maine incomes rose from 94.0 percent of the US 
median in 1994 to 96.3 percent in 2014. The broadest 
measure of Maine’s economy, its gross domestic product 
(GDP), also grew after 1994. Through 2014, real GDP 
increased 29 percent. However, US real GDP grew 49 
percent during that time. The difference seems to be 
that Maine GDP stagnated after 2004, while US GDP 
continued to grow. 
Exports have been a bright spot for Maine, increasing 
at over twice the annual rate of the rest of the economy 
(3.1 percent compared to 1.3 percent). In 2015, Maine’s 
top five export products were lobster (12.2 percent of 
total exports), civilian aircraft and parts (8.7 percent), 
electronic integrated circuits (8.3 percent), coniferous 
wood (5.7 percent), and chemical wood pulp (4.9 
percent). Top export destinations were Canada (46.5 
percent), Malaysia (7.7 percent), China (7.6 percent), 
Germany (3.8 percent), and Japan (3.0 percent).
Before 2007, growth of Maine exports often 
exceeded US growth; since 2007, it has generally lagged. 
Still, Maine food exports have increased significantly in 
the last decade, more than doubling from $288 million 
in 2007 to $588 million in 2015 (Table 1) (US Census 
Bureau: Economic Indicators Division USA Trade 
online). Exports of live lobster accounted for most of 
that growth, with additional contributions from farmed 
salmon, sea urchins, sea cucumbers, and elvers. 
According to Tom Bell in the Portland Press Herald 
(January 5, 2015), exports are a growth area for Maine 
food producers.
Employment measures also show slowing growth in 
recent years. Maine has gained almost 90,000 jobs since 
NAFTA (17 percent growth), but gains have been stifled 
by two national recessions, the continued decline of 
manufacturing, and slow population growth. For most 
of the 1990s, Maine’s job growth averaged 2 percent per 
year, but it has averaged just 0.5 percent annually since 
the Great Recession technically ended in 2009. Overall 
job gains mask deep losses in some industries. From 
1994 to 2015, the number of Maine workers employed 
in manufacturing fell 40 percent, from 83,000 to 
50,000. That decline was spread across many industries, 
with concentrations in paper, leather products, transpor-
tation equipment, computer and electronic products, 
and wood products.2
These job losses are part of a sectoral decline in 
manufacturing that predates NAFTA by 50 years. 
During World War II, manufacturing employed nearly 
Table 1: Maine’s Top 10 Food Commodity  
 Exports in 2015
Commodity
Value 
(millions)
Average 
annual 
increase  
2010–2015
-------- $ -------- -------- % -------
Lobster, live 347.0 15
Salmon, fillets 46.2 59
Sea urchins and sea cucumbers 25.2 -3*
Salmon, whole 21.5 -5
Potatoes, prepared and frozen 18.9 -15
Blueberries and cranberries, 
frozen
17.2 14
Blueberries and cranberries, 
fresh
11.8 0
Lobster, prepared 11.6 45
Maple sugar and syrup 7.5 13
Chicken eggs 4.6 15
* There are no recorded exports in the sea urchin and sea 
cucumber commodity category until 2012, so annual  
increase is based on 2012–2015.
Source: US Census Bureau: Economic Indicators Division  
USA Trade online.
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half (48.8 percent) of all Maine workers and 37.9 
percent of US workers. Those percentages gradually 
merged over the next 60 years. While this transition has 
not been painless, it does seem to be drawing to a close. 
As the Brookings Institution (2006: 6) noted, “The 
ongoing and still painful shift to a more diversified 
service-oriented economy means that [Maine] has less 
to lose in the future and more to gain.” As manufac-
turing employment has fallen, other sectors have grown. 
Since 1990, Maine has gained nearly 70,000 jobs in 
management, administrative services, and healthcare. 
These trends reflect a shift from goods to services 
that has occurred throughout the country. Technological 
advances and increased trade have lowered the cost of 
many goods and given consumers more income to 
spend on services such as health care, education, and 
entertainment. The net result is that between 1990 and 
2015, the number of jobs created by Maine service 
providers nearly equaled the entire goods-producing 
sector in 1990. Roughly two-thirds of service jobs are in 
business, health, and education professions. In 2015, 
their average earnings were $48,240, just under the 
average for goods-producing workers ($50,105). The 
remaining one-third of service jobs, in retail sales, 
leisure, and hospitality, averaged less than half that 
amount, $23,249. 
Regional Variations
Below the state-level gains, however, are stark 
regional differences. The decline of manufacturing and 
natural resource industries has hit some parts of Maine 
hard. Some remote communities never recover from the 
loss of a dominant employer. Furthermore, the aging of 
the population and the lack of in-migration has led to 
decline in many rural communities. From 1990 to 2015, 
jobs in the Portland labor market area grew 30 percent, 
Bangor and Lewiston grew 20 percent and 19 percent, 
respectively, and the rest of Maine grew just 4 percent.
The Role of Trade
The role of international trade in these changes has 
been debated for years. In 2003, the Maine Legislature 
authorized, “The Effects of NAFTA on the Maine 
Economy,” a report that assessed Maine’s economic 
gains and losses in the first decade of NAFTA’s exis-
tence (Planning Decisions 2003). According to the 
report, during that time, trade with Canada and 
Mexico grew twice as quickly as the rest of Maine’s 
economy, and the nature of trade diversified beyond its 
historic concentration in wood and paper products. 
Canadian investment in Maine grew. Furthermore, access 
to low-cost imports generated widespread consumer 
savings. The report asserts that Maine both lost and 
gained manufacturing jobs because of NAFTA, but the 
overall effect was likely a net loss. However, the report 
noted increases in broader economic measures including 
real personal income, gross state product, exports, and 
imports. It stopped short of saying whether NAFTA’s 
overall impact on Maine was positive or negative. 
Since 2003, those trends have continued. 
Manufacturing employment has declined further, and 
overall economic measures have risen slowly. Maine 
consumers have continued to benefit from low-priced 
imports, and the economic impact of those gains remains 
impossible to quantify. There is no single economic indi-
cator, or econometric calculation, that fully captures 
trade’s impact on Maine, but various aspects of trade’s 
effects are revealed by multiple indicators.
Trade-Induced Job Losses
Statistics from the federal Trade Adjustment 
Assistance (TAA) program are the best available measure 
of workers hurt by foreign competition. (Unfortunately, 
there is no corresponding measure of workers helped by 
foreign trade.) From 1996 to 2012, 81,487 Maine 
workers were involved in mass layoffs, and 27 percent 
qualified for TAA.3 The other 73 percent did not qualify, 
meaning the US Department of Labor determined that 
other forces such as technological advances, changing 
consumer demand, or domestic competition caused to 
their layoff (Burnett 2009). While trade has been a 
contributing factor to layoffs in Maine, it has not been 
the sole factor. 
From 1996 to 2012, 55 percent of Maine workers 
affected by mass layoffs were in manufacturing. Burnett 
(2009: 11) observed, “those [manufacturing] firms most 
likely to be vulnerable to international competition are 
those using more workers and paying lower wages (and 
thus probably not investing in productivity enhancing 
capital equipment) relative to their peers.” On the flip 
side, MDOL (2012: 1) noted, “manufacturers that have 
survived and are thriving are those that invested heavily 
in capital-intensive production systems that tend to 
have much higher performance requirements than what 
many of the former production workers possess in terms 
of education and experience.” Indeed, from 1990 to 
2010, Maine’s manufacturing workforce shrank, but 
became more productive and better educated. The total 
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value of manufactured goods produced stayed relatively 
constant even as employment fell. In discussing Maine’s 
textile and apparel industry, Burnett (2009: 5) noted, 
“workers in the few innovative surviving firms have had 
substantial real wage gains.”
Foreign imports do not appear to have affected the 
overall unemployment rate in Maine and the nation. 
US imports as percentage of GDP have roughly 
doubled over the last 40 years, while the unemployment 
rate has risen and fallen through multiple business 
cycles (Figure 2).
Foreign Investment
Employment by foreign-majority-owned affiliates 
in Maine increased 34 percent between 1993 and 2013, 
nearly double the growth rate of overall employment 
(18 percent) (Table 2). Planning Decisions (2003) noted 
increased Canadian investment following the passage of 
NAFTA. Familiar majority-Canadian-owned companies 
include Circle K, TD Bank, and TransCanada. Belgium-
based Delhaize Group owns Hannaford Brothers, 
Maine’s largest private employer with over 7,500 
employees. Foreign investment typically helps US 
workers through increases in wages, research and devel-
opment, exports, and productivity. 
Trade with China
It is impossible to discuss NAFTA’s impact on 
Maine without understanding the unrelated yet simul-
taneous increase in Chinese imports that occurred after 
NAFTA became law. As a percentage of US GDP, goods 
imported from Canada have been 
relatively stable since 1994, aver-
aging 2 percent; Mexican imports 
have grown from 0.7 percent to 1.6 
percent; and Chinese imports have 
grown from 0.5 percent to 2.69 
percent. State import data do not 
exist, but it is reasonable to assume 
that national trends reflect circum-
stances at the state level.4
The United States has no trade 
agreement with China other than 
the rules of the WTO. The United 
States first granted China “most 
favored nation” status in 1979 and 
renewed that designation every year 
until 2000, when the United States 
granted “permanent normal trade 
relations,” as part of China’s bid to join the WTO. 
Under these conditions, without a bilateral trade agree-
ment, goods from China have increased from less than 
5.8 percent of total US imports in 1994 to 21.5 percent 
in 2015. The value of China’s abundant resource—
low-skilled workers—has risen and put downward pres-
sure on the economic value of low-skilled workers in the 
United States and Maine.
Summary
Maine’s economy has changed in fundamental 
ways since 1994. It has continued its decades-long 
evolution from an economy based on manufacturing 
and natural resources to one based on innovation and 
services. While it is impossible to quantify trade’s 
myriad impacts on jobs, incomes, and consumer prices, 
it is possible to observe that Maine’s economy has 
Figure 2: US and Maine Unemployment Rates and US Imports
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Table 2: Changes in Employment in Maine,  
 1993 to 2013
1993 2013
Change 
%
Total private employment  
in Maine
424,000 501,200 18 
Employment by foreign- 
majority-owned companies
24,200 32,400 34
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Foreign  
Direct Investment in the United States (FDIUS), 
Table G-8.
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grown. However, growth has occurred unevenly across 
the state, it has often lagged US growth, and it is 
slowing. Thousands of individuals have experienced 
painful layoffs, and many communities have suffered 
the irreversible loss of a dominant employer. Many 
other individuals and communities have benefited from 
new economic opportunities that did not exist in 1994. 
If the Maine businesses most vulnerable to interna-
tional competition have closed, relocated, or learned 
how to compete, then losses generated by previous 
changes in trade will not be repeated. Moreover, the 
gains from future trade growth could be greater if 
sectors of Maine’s economy that benefit from trade have 
grown. Maine exporters may gain better access to 
foreign markets; Maine consumers may benefit from 
lower-cost imports; and Maine service providers may 
gain if their customers have 
greater purchasing power. 
Whether Maine gains net jobs 
will depend on the ability of 
its businesses to capitalize on 
the new opportunities created 
by agreement such as the TPP 
and the related increases in 
consumer purchasing power. 
ABOUT THE TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
If the TPP passed, it would be the largest FTA in which 
the United States partici-
pates.5 The 12 countries in 
the TPP accounted for 36 
percent of world GDP in 
2014, although most of that 
(22 percent) was the United 
States (Table 3).6 All TPP 
countries are members of the 
WTO, meaning they already 
abide by an extensive set of 
rules on anticompetitive prac-
tices and dispute resolution. 
By negotiating the TPP, the 
parties hope to secure even 
more favorable terms for their 
businesses and consumers 
and to reach agreement on 
complex issues outside the 
WTO forum. The TPP is designed to be a living agree-
ment that could add countries over time.
The United States has existing trade agreements 
with six TPP members: Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Mexico, Peru, and Singapore. Collectively, those coun-
tries plus the United States account for over 80 percent 
of the total economic output of the TPP region. Given 
the large portion of the TPP region with which the 
United States has already liberalized trade, most of the 
agreement’s economic impact will be in liberalizing 
trade with the other five countries (Brunei, Japan, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam).
The TPP would eventually eliminate nearly all 
tariffs on goods traded between member countries, but 
the phase-out periods vary significantly. For example, 
Singapore would eliminate all tariffs on all goods as soon 
Table 3: TPP Member Countries
TPP member country
Percentage 
of world 
GDP 2014
Percentage 
of world 
population 
2015
Per capita 
income 
2014
Average 
tarif
% % %
Existing US free-trade agreement
Australia 1.87 0.32 61,980 2.7
Canada 2.29 0.49 50,231 4.2
Chile 0.33 0.24 14,528 6.0
Mexico 1.66 1.73 10,326 7.5
Peru 0.26 0.43 6,541 3.4
Singapore 0.39 0.08 56,284 0.2
United States 22.34 4.38 54,629 3.5
No existing US free-trade agreement
Brunei 0.02 0.01 40,980 1.2
Japan 5.90 1.73 36,194 4.2
Malaysia 0.43 0.41 11,307 6.1
New Zealand 0.26 0.06 44,342 2.0
Vietnam 0.24 1.25 2,052 9.5
Total, all TPP members 36.0 11.1
TPP members with existing  
US trade agreement
29.1 7.7
TPP members without existing  
US trade agreement
6.9 3.4
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators; and World Trade Organization,  
member nation tariff profiles. Average tariff is the average rate applied to  
imports from nations with whom the TPP member does not have an FTA.
$
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as the agreement takes effect, whereas the United States 
would eliminate most tariffs within a decade, with 
others remaining in place for up to 30 years.
For the United States, the TPP’s most significant new 
market is Japan, a large, relatively high-income country 
with protectionist tariffs in several areas. Japan is the 
United States’ third largest export market in the TPP after 
Canada and Mexico, importing $62.5 million worth of 
US goods in 2015. As an article on Bloomberg’s website 
(June 18, 2013) by Brian Winfield suggests, Japan has 
begun to loosen its historically high tariffs on some prod-
ucts, motivated partly by its struggling domestic economy. 
Japan signed an FTA with Australia in 2014 and is 
currently negotiating an agreement with the European 
Union. Some proponents of the TPP argue that without 
the partnership, US companies will begin to lose market 
share in Japan (US Department of Agriculture 2016). 
Malaysia and Vietnam also stand out among the 
TPP members without existing US FTAs. They have 
sizable populations, fast-growing economies, and rela-
tively low wages. From 2010 to 2015, the average 
annual growth of US imports from Vietnam and 
Malaysia was 21 percent and 6 percent, respectively. 
Furthermore, these countries currently impose relatively 
high tariffs on US imports, averaging 9.5 percent and 
6.1 percent, respectively.
In addition to tariff reductions, the TPP covers 
numerous complex topics including digital trade, finan-
cial services, intellectual property rights, government 
procurement, patent laws, and labor and environmental 
standards. Its chapter on investor-state dispute resolu-
tion is perhaps its most controversial. These elements are 
important to consider when evaluating the agreement’s 
overall value.  
THE TPP’S ESTIMATED ECONOMIC IMPACT
Background
The US International Trade Commission (USITC) 
and several independent groups have assessed the TPP’s 
potential impact on the US economy. There are several 
points to consider when interpreting the studies’ results. 
First, these studies focus on the most quantifiable 
aspect of the TPP—its effect of tariffs and quotas. They 
do not attempt to estimate the impacts of less quantifi-
able elements such as environmental and labor regula-
tions, regulatory coherence, or legal ramifications, nor 
do they estimate the TPP’s geopolitical impact. The 
TPP’s economic impact is just one of several important 
points of consideration.
Second, the impact of an FTA is estimated by 
generating two projections of future economic condi-
tions, one with the FTA and one without it (often called 
the “baseline” scenario). The differences in employment, 
wages, and GDP, for example, are interpreted as the 
FTA’s economic impact. 
Third, the numbers generated by economic models 
should be interpreted as indicators of the probable 
THE TPP’S NOVEL COMPONENTS
US FTAs have become more comprehensive over time, 
and the TPP continues that trend. The following list 
is drawn from various reports by the Congressional 
Research Service. The TPP is the first US FTA to 
•	include	enforcement	mechanisms	(i.e.,	trade	
restrictions) for violating the labor standards of the 
International Labour Organisation; 
•	require	criminal	penalties	for	theft	of	trade	secrets,	
including theft by state-owned enterprises; 
•	address	overfishing	and	specifically	prohibit	subsi-
dies that harm overfished stocks; 
•	require	open	access	for	providers	of	electronic	
payment card services (credit and debit cards); 
•	cover	wireless	telecommunications	service	
providers, ensuring regulatory transparency and 
access to government-controlled infrastructure and 
resources such as bandwidth; 
•	contain	a	stand-alone	chapter	on	regulatory	coher-
ence, although without an enforcement mechanism; 
•	include	a	specific	length	of	exclusivity	rights	for	
biologics (drugs made from living organisms, such 
as vaccines); 
•	mention	agricultural	biotechnology	(GMOs),	
although only to establish a working group and 
share information on laws and regulations; 
•	specify	that	a	country’s	failure	to	act	in	accordance	
with an investor’s expectations is not enough to 
constitute a breach of the agreement; and
•	exempt	antismoking	measures	from	dispute	settle-
ment.
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magnitude and direction of future impacts, not precise 
predictions. In fact, it is common not to publicize exact 
annual estimates to avoid conveying a false sense of 
precision. 
Fourth, the assessments are attempts to isolate the 
impact that one variable (the FTA) will have on the 
future economy. In reality, innumerable other variables 
(unanticipated changes in energy prices, geopolitics, 
fiscal and monetary policies, consumer preferences.) will 
also affect the economy. 
Table 4 summarizes the major findings of four 
assessments of the TPP’s potential economic impact: 
two for the US economy, one for the world economy, 
and one for a specific sector (agriculture). These studies 
are methodologically sound and representative of other 
TPP assessments in terms of methods, scope, and results. 
Furthermore, three of the four were conducted after the 
TPP’s full text became public and therefore contain 
fewer speculative assumptions about the agreement than 
earlier studies. 
These studies generally find that the TPP would 
have neutral or slightly positive effects on the US 
economy as a whole and increase both imports from 
and exports to the TPP countries without an existing 
US FTA (Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and 
Vietnam).
The USITC study, which is the basis for the Maine 
estimates in this article, found that the TPP would have 
a modest, positive impact on the US economy in 2032. 
Compared to a baseline scenario, the TPP would increase 
US GDP, exports, and imports by 0.15 percent, 1.0 
percent, and 1.1 percent, respectively. The largest export 
gains by percentage would be in agriculture and food 
(2.6 percent), with smaller gains in manufacturing, 
natural resources, and energy (0.9 percent), and services 
(0.6 percent). Import growth of 1.1 percent would be 
evenly spread across all sectors. Compared to the baseline, 
the TPP would increase US jobs by 0.07 percent and real 
wages by 0.19 percent in 2032, with gains spread rela-
tively equally across skilled and unskilled labor. 
There are at least two reasons the magnitude of 
these results may appear small compared to the portion 
the global economy encompassed by the TPP. First, the 
estimated impact of any FTA often appears small rela-
tive to the large, observable impacts of globalization. 
Even retrospective assessments of past FTAs find that 
most have only a marginal impact on overall US 
economic growth, primarily due to the sheer size of the 
US economy (Tyler 2006). Second, one of the most 
notable differences between the TPP and past FTAs 
such as NAFTA is the degree to which US companies 
are now accustomed to competing with international 
imports. In 1993, just 38.8 percent of US imports were 
duty free. In 2015, fully 68.6 percent were duty free. 
Many of the businesses most vulnerable to foreign 
imports have closed, relocated, or learned how to 
compete. Many other businesses are learning how to use 
the new opportunities created by trade, such as cheaper 
imports, foreign customer markets, and consumers with 
greater purchasing power. Having traveled down the 
Table 4: Economic Impacts of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Institution (Authors)
Forecast 
year GDP % Exports/imports
Impact on United States
Employment Additional notes
USITC  
(Signoret et al.)
2032 +0.15
Exports: +1.0%
Imports: +1.1%
+0.07%
Real wages: +0.19%
Ag exports: +5.4%
Ag imports: +2.0%
USDA  
(Burfisher et al.)
2025 0.0 NA NA
No change overall
Additional job “churn”: 0.1%
Peterson Institute for 
International Economics 
(Petri and Plummer)
2030 +0.5
Exports: +9.1%
Imports: NA
No change 
overall
Additional job 
“churn”: 0.1%
Skilled real wages: +0.63%
Unskilled real wages: +0.37%
Annual cost of delay: –0.5% of GDP
World Bank (Lakatos et al.) 2030 +0.6* NA NA
Skilled real wages: +0.6% 
Unskilled real wages: +0.4%
*Combined impact on NAFTA countries.
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road of globalization for several decades, further expan-
sions of trade may now have a less powerful effect on the 
US economy than earlier expansions.
Of the several rigorous studies of the TPP’s poten-
tial impact, the USITC is the best suited for generating 
state-level impacts. It provides the most detail across all 
industrial sectors and the best documentation of the 
categories included in each industry. Furthermore, its 
model is based on methodology that it widely respected 
within the academic community.
THE TPP’S ESTIMATED ECONOMIC 
IMPACT ON MAINE
This section presents estimates of the TPP’s economic impact on Maine, extrapolated from the USITC 
estimates of its likely impact on the United States. 
The USITC assesses effects in three categories: econ-
omy-wide measures (income, gross domestic product, 
employment, and capital stock), trade (imports and 
exports), and industrial sectors (three broad sectors and 
56 detailed sectors). 
The USITC estimates describe the TPP’s expected 
impact on the entire US economy. To translate that into 
the likely impact on Maine, we first establish the relation-
ship between recent economic activity in Maine relative 
to the nation. We calculate the average percentage of US 
economic activity that occurred in Maine during the last 
three years. We then apply those ratios to the USITC 
estimates for national economic impacts. For example, 
from 2012 to 2014, Maine GDP was 0.32 percent of US 
GDP. The USITC estimates that the TPP would increase 
US GDP by $42.7 billion in 2032. If 0.32 percent of that 
growth occurs in Maine, then we estimate that Maine 
GDP would increase $138 million in 2032. 
This approach assumes that the relationship between 
the Maine and US economies remains constant through 
2032. In reality, differing levels of public and private 
investment and demographic change may cause some 
states to grow faster than others. Population projections 
suggest that Maine’s economy may account for a smaller 
portion of the nation’s future economic growth than it 
does today. However, quantifying the likely effects of 
those changes would require substantial analysis with 
additional assumptions, little data, and considerable 
imprecision. Furthermore, it would probably affect the 
results only minimally. Thus, we use a simple extrapola-
tion with maximum transparency and minimum 
assumptions. Assuming Maine’s economy constitutes an 
equal or smaller percentage of the US economy in 2032 
than it does today, the following estimates can be viewed 
as upper-bounds of the TPP’s potential impact.
Where the USITC estimates the TPP’s potential 
impact on the level of overall US employment, it is 
possible to extrapolate the potential impact on Maine 
employment by calculating a ratio as described above. 
Where the USITC presents the TPP’s impact as a 
percentage change in US employment, as it does for 
sectors and industries, no further extrapolations are 
necessary. Since this methodology assumes that the 
TPP’s Maine impacts are proportional to its US impacts, 
the USITC’s percentage estimates for changes to 
employment are the de facto projections of Maine. 
Where that occurs, we present the Maine–US employ-
ment ratio for context only.  
Economy-wide Effects
The USITC estimates that the TPP would have 
slight, positive effects on overall measures of US 
economic growth. In 2032, it would increase real 
income, real GDP, and employment by 0.23 percent, 
0.15 percent, and 0.07 percent, respectively. These 
changes would come from higher earnings due to 
increased exports and reduced costs due to cheaper 
imports. Savings from reduced costs would give 
consumers and businesses additional money to spend or 
invest elsewhere in the economy.
Maine’s share of these gains also would be small: in 
2032 there would be about 554 additional FTE jobs, 
real GDP would increase by approximately $106 per 
capita, and real income would increase by approximately 
$163 per capita. That means the TPP’s value to Maine 
residents in 2032 would be equivalent to about $163 per 
person (Table 5). 
Trade Effects
Trade among TPP countries would increase if the 
agreement went into effect, with the largest increases 
occurring where current trade barriers are highest. The 
USITC estimates that overall US exports to TPP coun-
tries would increase $57.2 billion in 2032. The highest 
percentage increases would be with countries without an 
existing US FTA (Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
and Vietnam). Some of those sales would be diverted 
from non-TPP countries, so the overall impact would 
be a $27.2 billion increase in US exports. Imports 
would rise by approximately $48.9 billion (Table 6). 
Therefore, the overall result would be a deepening of the 
US trade deficit by about $21.7 billion. 
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Maine has a slightly higher percentage of exports to 
TPP countries than the rest of the country due to 
concentrations of sales to Malaysia (semiconductors) 
and Canada (lobster, wood, and paper). Malaysia is in 
the new-FTA-partners category and Canada is an 
existing FTA partner. Total Maine exports to TPP coun-
tries would increase by about $143 million. Accounting 
for sales diverted from non-TPP countries, total Maine 
exports would increase by about $47 million. There are 
no data on state imports due to the difficulty of tracking 
goods once they enter the country. Therefore, it is not 
possible to generate an estimate of the TPP’s impact on 
Maine imports.
Sector Effects
The TPP would generate overall economic gains, 
but its effect on various sectors and industries would 
differ. The USITC estimates impacts in three broad 
sectors (agriculture and food; manufacturing, natural 
resources, and energy; and services) and 56 industries. 
In some cases, the USITC cate-
gories do not align with industry 
data available at the state level. In 
other cases, there is no Maine 
production in small industrial 
categories or there is insufficient 
data to generate meaningful esti-
mates. This was especially true in 
agriculture. Furthermore, there 
are no statistics on state imports 
or state service exports. In 
general, there is better state-level 
information on employment and 
exports, which must be reported, 
than on output, which is often 
proprietary. The following 
sections discuss the calculations 
that were possible given those 
limitations.
Agriculture and Food
Agriculture and food is by 
far the smallest of the USITC 
sectors in both Maine and the 
nation. However, it would have 
the largest percentage gains 
because many countries have 
high tariffs in this sector. US 
agriculture and food exports and 
imports would both increase, but 
exports would rise more. The net 
gain would be $4.5 billion in 
2032 (Table 7). There is no 
corresponding import data for 
Maine, but it is reasonable to 
assume that Maine consumers 
have spending habits similar to 
their US peers, so Maine also 
would likely experience a net 
Table 5: Estimated Economy-wide Effects of TPP on the United  
 States and Maine: Changes Relative to Baseline in 2032
Effect
United States (USITC) Maine
Level 
(billion) Percentage
Percentage 
of Maine’s 
share of US 
economic 
activity
Level 
(million)
Per 
capita
Real income $57.3 0.23 0.37 $212 $163
Real GDP $42.7 0.15 0.32 $138 $106
Employment  
(full-time equivalents)
128,200 0.07 0.43 554 —
Table 6: Estimated Trade Effects of TPP on the United States and  
 Maine: Changes Relative to Baseline in 2032
United States (USITC) Maine
Level 
(billion) Percentage
Percentage 
of Maine’s 
share of US 
economic 
activity
Level 
(million)
Per 
capita
Exports to  
TPP partners
$57.2 5.6 0.25 $143 $110
New FTA partners $34.6 18.7 0.29 $100 $77
Existing FTA partners $22.6 2.7 0.24 $55 $43
Total worldwide 
exports
$27.2 1.0 0.17 $47 $36
Imports from  
TPP partners
$47.5 3.5 — — —
New FTA partners $23.4 10.4 — — —
Existing FTA partners $24.2 2.1 — — —
Total worldwide 
imports
$48.9 1.1 — — —
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gain in this sector. The size of the gain would depend on 
the ability of Maine farmers and food processors to 
leverage the new market opportunities created by tariff 
reductions in other countries.
The USITC estimates that the TPP would slightly 
increase output in all US agriculture and food industries 
except rice, soybeans, and seafood. However, it is diffi-
cult to extrapolate from those results for Maine because 
of the small size of the state’s agricultural industries. In 
many cases, there is no or little Maine production or 
data are not disclosable due to privacy protections. Two 
industries for which it is possible to extrapolate results 
are seafood and dairy.
In seafood, US output would likely decline by 
about 0.2 percent in 2032. Exports would increase 
about 2.2 percent, with exports to Japan and Vietnam 
increasing 18 percent and 45 percent, respectively. 
Seafood imports would increase about 0.9 percent and 
would exceed the value of exports by more than three to 
one ($231.9 billion compared to $74.1 billion). Most of 
the import growth would be from TPP members 
without an existing FTA.
How these changes would affect Maine fisheries 
would depend on the degree to which domestic 
consumers find seafood imported from TPP countries 
to be a substitute for Maine fish and shellfish and on the 
ability of Maine businesses to exploit new market 
opportunities. US tariffs on most seafood are already 
low, and Maine consumers can already access a wide 
variety of foreign seafood. 
The proven ability of Maine’s lobster industry to 
access foreign markets suggests that it would gain under 
the TPP. Current tariffs on Maine lobsters are as high as 
34 percent in Vietnam, 8 percent in Malaysia, and 5 
percent in Japan and New Zealand, depending on how 
it is processed and shipped. Increased exports to South 
Korea following the implementation of a trade agree-
ment with that country have led some people within 
Maine’s seafood industry to be optimistic that the TPP 
would further increase demand from Asia.7
The USITC expects that the TPP would increase US 
dairy output by 1.3 percent in 2032. An increase in US 
dairy exports translates to an increased in Maine dairy 
exports of about $2.7 million in 2032, based on Maine’s 
small percentage of US dairy exports (0.15 percent). 
Maine has a slightly larger percentage of US processed 
food exports (0.35 percent). Growth in that sector would 
translate to about $5.4 million in additional exports in 
2032 and output growth of 0.8 percent.
Two crops of particular interest, potatoes and blue-
berries, are included in the large USITC categories of 
“processed foods” and “fresh fruit, vegetables, and nuts.” 
Without further detail, it is impossible to calculate 
appropriate ratios and extrapolate state impacts from the 
national estimates. However, it is noteworthy that Japan, 
Malaysia, and Vietnam would eliminate their tariffs on 
fresh, frozen, and prepared potatoes, which range from 
about 8.5 percent in Japan to as much as 34 percent in 
Vietnam (USDA 2016). Those countries would also 
eliminate tariffs on categories that include blueberries, 
which range from as high as 17 percent in Japan to 30 
percent in Malaysia and Vietnam (USDA 2016).
Services
International trade barriers in services are already 
relatively low, so percentage changes in this sector are 
generally smaller than in agriculture and food. However, 
because it is such a large sector, the absolute gains are 
large. According to the USITC, 
the increased demand for services 
would exceed the US supply, 
thereby increasing demand for 
imported services (Table 8). This 
would presumably occur as 
cheaper imports gave US 
consumers and businesses more 
money to spend on services. 
The USITC estimates that 
the TPP would slightly increase 
output and employment in all 
service sectors except transporta-
tion, logistics, travel, and tourism 
(those industries are combined 
Table 7: Agriculture and Food Sector: Estimated Effects of TPP  
 Relative to Baseline in 2032
United States (USITC) Maine
Level 
(billion) Percentage
Percentage 
of Maine’s 
share of US 
economic 
activity
Level 
(million)
Per 
capita
Output $10.0 0.5 0.36 $36 $28
Exports $7.2 2.6 0.38 $27 $21
Imports $2.7 1.5 — — —
Employment — 0.5 0.40 — —
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into one subsector). They suggest two reasons for 
reduced growth in that subsector. First, trade barriers in 
these areas are already low and the TPP would not liber-
alize them significantly. The model assumes that 
economic resources would shift to areas where trade 
liberalization creates new opportunities and away from 
less dynamic sectors. Second, this subsector includes 
international tourism. If income gains allow more US 
residents to travel abroad, that would appear in the 
model as higher tourism imports. However, a loss for 
the United States may be a gain for Maine. Greater 
travel by US residents would likely benefit all tourism 
destinations, both domestic and foreign. 
Manufacturing, Natural Resources, and Energy
According to the USITC estimates, the US manu-
facturing, natural resources, and energy sector would fare 
the worst from increased competition from foreign 
imports. Exports would increase by about $15.2 billion, 
but imports would grow by nearly three times that 
amount ($39.2 billion), resulting in an overall drop in 
output (Table 9). These results reflect a continuation of 
recent trends. In Maine, these results suggest that 
export-oriented manufacturers would fare better than 
those who are not export oriented.
The USITC’s estimates suggest that the TPP would 
have a neutral or slightly positive impact on output for 
11 of 25 industries in energy, natural resources, and 
manufacturing (including apparel, footwear, and 
passenger vehicles). It would reduce output growth in 
the remaining 14 industries (including textiles, leather, 
forestry, and electrical equipment). The USITC notes 
that all industries within this sector are expected to grow 
in 2032 in absolute terms. Therefore, the negative 
results are reductions in growth, not absolute declines.
The USITC predicts slight increases in output of 
US apparel and footwear. Indeed, the American Apparel 
and Footwear Association and the Footwear Distributors 
and Retailers of America have endorsed the TPP. Many 
US companies in this industry have factories in Vietnam 
and Malaysia, so tariff reductions 
would lower their costs. 
New Balance, an athletic-shoe 
maker with approximately 900 
employees at operations in 
Norridgewock, Skowhegan, and 
Norway, Maine, is unique in 
opposing the TPP (http:// 
newbalance.newsmarket.com/). 
Although it imports some shoes 
and shoe components, a large part 
of its business is US-made shoes 
that currently benefit from a tariff 
on lower-cost imported shoes. The 
TPP would lower and eventually 
eliminate that tariff. That would 
lower prices for US athletic-shoe 
buyers, but potentially make New 
Balance’s domestic operations 
unviable. According Jon Chesto 
(Boston Globe, June 25, 2016), 
separate bills approved by both the 
US House of Representatives and 
US Senate would require the 
Department of Defense to 
purchase only US-made athletic 
shoes for military recruits. Since 
New Balance and Wolverine 
Worldwide, a Michigan shoemaker, 
Table 8: Services: Estimated Effects of TPP Relative to Baseline  
 in 2032
United States (USITC) Maine
Level 
(billion) Percentage
Percentage 
of Maine’s 
share of US 
economic 
activity
Level 
(million)
Per 
capita
Output $42.3 0.1 0.34 $144 $111
Exports $4.8 0.6 0.34 $16 $13
Imports $7.0 1.2 — — —
Employment — 0.1 0.43 — —
Table 9: Manufacturing, Natural Resources, and Energy:  
 Estimated Effects of TPP Relative to Baseline in 2032
United States (USITC) Maine
Level 
(billion) Percentage
Percentage 
of Maine’s 
share of US 
economic 
activity
Level 
(million)
Per 
capita
Output $-10.8 -0.1 0.22 $-24 $-18
Exports $15.2 0.9 0.15 $23 $18
Imports $39.2 1.1 — — —
Employment — -0.2 0.44 — —
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are the only companies that could currently satisfy that 
order, passage of the bill could offset some of the poten-
tial negative impact of the tariff reduction. However, as 
of this publication, the bills are not yet law.
The USITC estimates a 2.1 percent increase in 
wood product imports primarily from TPP members 
without an existing FTA. There would be a smaller 
increase in US exports, but the overall result would be a 
0.5 percent output reduction in 2032. In Maine, that 
corresponds to a decrease in wood products of about 
$18 million in 2032.
CONCLUSION
The TPP would likely have a neutral or slightly positive impact on overall measures of Maine’s 
economy in the long run. The benefits would be rela-
tively small and spread across the population. The real 
income gains for Maine residents, in terms of increased 
earnings and greater purchasing power from lower-cost 
products, would equal about $163 per person in 2032. 
Underlying those overall gains, some sectors would 
experience a slight reduction in growth in terms of jobs, 
output, and exports. 
The TPP’s estimated economic impact is smaller 
than the public fervor about it would suggest. There are 
at least three reasons for that. First, the estimated impact 
of any FTA often appears small relative to the large, 
observable impacts of globalization. Second, the United 
States has already liberalized trade with six of eleven TPP 
countries, so the agreement’s marginal impact is smaller 
than it would appear at first. Third, Maine’s economy 
has experienced irreversible structural changes in the last 
few decades and will now react to changes in trade 
differently than in the past.  -
ENDNOTES
1 https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press 
-Release/2015pr/12/ft920/index.html
2 Data in this paragraph come from the following 
sources: Income statistics: US Census Bureau, Current 
Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic 
Supplements. Table H-8. Median Household Income 
by State: 1984 to 2014. GDP: US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Real Gross Domestic Product in Chained 
Dollars. Exports: US Census Bureau, Economic 
Indicators Division, USA Trade Online: State commodity 
exports by Harmonized System Code (HS). https://
usatrade.census.gov/
3 Data from US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Mass Layoff 
Statistics, Series ID: MLUMS23NN0001005. https://www 
.bls.gov/mls/ and US Department of Labor, Employment 
and Training Administration, Trade Adjustment 
Assistance for Workers Program Petition Data. https://
www.doleta.gov/tradeact/taa_reports/petitions.cfm
4 Data in this section are from the US Census Bureau, 
Country and Product Trade Data, Exports, Imports and 
Trade Balance by Country, Monthly Totals, 1985–Present. 
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/country 
/index.html
5 If the TPP became law, NAFTA and other FTAs would 
remain in effect. Where TPP and other FTAs differ 
(in terms of tariff rates or rules of origin) firms could 
choose which agreement to use.
6 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD)
7 According to an article in the Bangor Daily News 
(November 25, 2016), Emily Lane of Calendar Island 
Lobster Co. in Portland said, “We’ve already seen this 
with the free trade agreement with South Korea. That 
caused a significant increase in lobster consumption 
over the last couple years.” 
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